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ABSTRACT 
            
Effective Democracy and Performance of Government 
By 
Ji-hyeon, Seo 
 
Good governance is a common prescription provided for developing countries to grow. However, the 
current guide on good governance are not only demanding but also skeptical for its effect on growth, 
therefore many insist reducing it to essential institution. While the dominant view on this discussion is 
that protection of property right is the core prerequisite, referring to history, quality of government 
should be the most preceding condition. It is because the former and the other institutions are 
basically the outcome of government’s choice. On that account, this study aims at specifying the 
factors which have significant impact on quality of government and verifying it by quantitative 
analysis. The conclusion of the effort is that voice of people is highly relevant to performance of 
government, thereby to the economic development of countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Regarding the association between good governance and economic growth, the academic views are 
still on debate. Despite the findings suggested by renowned researchers asserting that “institutions 
rule”, the doubt over its relationship with growth seems to come from our experience. Growth under 
imperfect institutions has been witnessed not just in the newly industrialized countries, especially East 
Asian countries including China, but also in the developed countries at their early stage of 
development.  
 
In order to deal with the discrepancy between theory and experience, demands has been made for 
narrowing down core institution to which economic development is fundamentally linked. This 
attempt ultimately boils down to quality of government enabling at proper choice and action for 
public. It is because such attribute of government is a starting point of many other good institutions in 
the form of policies, such as property right security, control of corruption, stability of financial 
institutions, which can be flexibly operated in each country’s context. 
 
The main question of this paper arises at this point: then, what factors affect the condition under 
which the governments try to meet public demand?  
 
The rest of this study is going to explore on this issue in this way: In the following literature review, 
the extensive concept of governance will be broken down and core institution compelling 
responsiveness of government will be identified. In the next part, empirical analysis is going to be 
conducted on the relationship between the identified variable and performance of government.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Good governance and growth: an uncertain relationship  
 
Good governance is generally regarded as a key element for economic development these days. Large 
volumes of institutions literature (North, 1991; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Acemoglu and Johnson, 
2001: Kaufman et al, 2002; Rodrik et al, 2004) have been supporting this theory, since Adam Smith 
maintained in the Wealth of Nation that there is a certain condition of state for commerce and 
manufactures to thrive.  
 
While definition and extent of good governance vary due to its excessively broad boundaries, Keefer 
(2004) helps understanding by dividing it into two categories. The first category of governance is 
about optimal policies or services that government provides to meet citizen’s needs, such as security 
of property rights, rule of law, control of corruption, financial institutions, modern bureaucracy, and so 
on. The second category deals with more fundamental dimension such as setting and dynamic in 
which government actors have incentive to pursue public interest. As Keefer noted, the two are 
distinctive in the sense that the former is “outcomes” while the latter is “causal”.  
 
Table 1. Definitions of good governance by international organizations 
“Outcomes” side “Causal” side 
The US agency for 
International 
Development 
“maintain social peace, guarantee 
law and order, promote or create 
conditions necessary for economic 
growth, and ensure a minimum 
level of social security” 
The Institute 
of 
Governance 
(Canada) 
“the traditions, institutions and 
processes that determine how 
power is exercised, how citizens 
are given a voice, and how 
decisions are made on issues of 
public concern.” 
World Bank 
“building efficient and accountable 
public sector institutions” 
The International 
Monetary Fund 
More stress on “the transparency 
of government accounts, the 
effectiveness of public resource 
management, and the stability and 
transparency of the economic and 
regulatory environment for private 
sector activity.” 
Source: Keefer (2004, 4), www.imf.org 
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Unquestionably, the mainstream governance discussion is more associated with the first category, 
trying to find a link between economic development and some component of “good governance”, for 
example, property right protection and growth, or stability of financial institution and growth. It is 
true that these efforts should receive credit for establishing the widely recognized proposition that 
good governance is prerequisite for growth. 
  
However, it is also true that many are skeptical about this assertion. The criticism addresses mainly 
three issues: a) weak explanatory power for reality; b) low reliability of empirical evidence largely 
resulted from endogeneity; c) poor policy implications.  
  
Regarding the first issue, opponents cast doubt on if good governance really mattered for growth so 
far. Based on historical evidences, Chang (2001) compares the quality of institution between 
developed countries at the time of industrialization and developing countries of today. Coverage of 
institutions in the study is as follows: Democracy (Male suffrage, Universal suffrage); Modern 
bureaucracy; Modern judiciary; Intellectual property rights (Patent law, Modern patent law, 
Trademark law); Corporate governance institutions (General limited liability, Bankruptcy law, 
Modern bankruptcy law, Modern auditing/disclosure, Competition law, Effective competition law; 
Financial institutions (Modern banking, Central banking, Modern central Banking, Securities 
regulation, Modern securities regulation, Income tax); Social welfare and labor institutions(Industrial 
accident institutions, Health insurance, State pension, Unemployment insurance, and Child labor 
regulation, Modern child labor regulation). The conclusion of this attempt is that “the now developed 
countries (NDCs) were institutionally less advanced compared to the currently developing countries 
at similar stages of development (Ibid, 28)”. Table 2 presents one of examples to illustrate immaturity 
of institutions in early times of many NDCs by indicating that they lagged behind in adoption of 
universal suffrage than developing countries in the sense of income per capita level. 
 
Table 2. Income per capita at attainment of universal suffrage 
GDP p.c. 
(in 1990 international dollars)  
 
Now Developed Countries (Year 
universal suffrage was attained; 
GDP p.c.) 
Developing Countries 
(Year universal suffrage was 
attained; GDP p.c.) 
<$1,000  Bangladesh(1947;$585) 
Burma (1948; $393)  
Egypt (1952; $542)  
Ethiopia (1955; $295)  
India (1947; $641)  
Indonesia (1945; $514)  
Kenya (1963; $713)  
Pakistan (1947; $631)  
South Korea (1948; $777) 
Tanzania (1962; $506)  
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Zaire (1967; $707) 
$1,000-$1,999  Bulgaria (1945; $1,073)  
Ghana (1957; $1,159)  
Hungary (1945; $1,721) 
Mexico (1947; $1,882)  
Nigeria (1979; $1,189)  
Turkey (1946; $1,129) 
$2,000-$2,999 Austria (1918; $2,572) 
Germany (1946; $2,503)  
Italy (1946; $2,448)  
Japan (195210; $2,277)  
Norway (1913; $2,275)  
Spain (1931; $2,713)  
Sweden (1918; $2,533) 
Columbia (1957; $2,382) 
Ireland ($2,625)  
Peru (1956; $2,732)  
Philippines (1981; $2,526) 
$3,000-$3,999 Denmark (1915; $3,635) 
Finland (1944; $3,578)  
France (1946; $3,819 
Taiwan, Province of China 
(1972; $3,313)  
Chile (1949; $3,715) 
$4,000-$4,999 Belgium (1948; $4,917)  
Netherlands (1919; $4,022) 
Brazil (1977; $4,613) 
$5,000-$9,999 Australia (1962; $8,691)  
New Zealand (190711; $5,367) 
Portugal (1970; $5,885)  
UK (1928; $5,115) 
Argentina (1947; $5,089) 
Venezuela (1947; $6,894) 
>$10,000 Canada (197012; $11,758) 
Switzerland (1971; $17,142) USA 
(1965; $13,316) 
 
Sources: Chang (2001) recited, {Therborn (1977); Elections (1989); Maddison (1995)} 
 
According to Chang, the western countries in their earlier times seem not to be a model case in terms 
of good governance. This inconsistency might be explained by some omitted variables existing in 
early 20th century, or the logic that innovation of institution takes more time than catching it up. If so, 
what about the other states which succeeded in development in more recent times? Did they meet the 
criteria of good governance?  
 
It is well known that the development strategies of late-comers (or most of the East Asian countries) 
were mix of “orthodox” and “unorthodox” ways. It means that they in part followed some principles 
of good governance such as promoting free transactions, investing in promising industries, and 
providing decent services to the public while ruling by dictatorship, intervening markets strongly, and 
tolerating corruptions. After all, it worked very well and countries including China, South Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Malaysia converged. Through exploring these cases, a contradiction can be 
noticed intuitively: does the established theory of good governance properly explain the real world?  
 
In fact, many are in doubt about the empirical grounds of good governance researches. Examining 
Knack-IRIS and Kaufmann-World Bank dataset which was used as government quality indicators in 
the most cited governance literatures (Knack and Keefer, 1995, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Kaufman, 
Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999), Khan(2007) states that it is implausible for the governance 
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variables to have significant impact on economic growth considering the fact that the median value of 
governance variables is little different between converging and diverging countries. It suggests that 
high scores of advanced countries on governance seem to have strong influence on the empirical 
result. Therefore, endogeneity or reverse causality should be present which hints that it is more likely 
for wealthier nations to have better governance, rather than the reverse.  
 
Regarding endogeneity issue of institution literatures, Vollrath (2014) identifies “vague measurement 
of institution” as its cause. That is, even though the methodology to produce the dataset is sound, it is 
ambiguous to understand the difference of institution between countries based on such governance 
indices, because the small point gap on a scale of 1 to 10 does not give practical information as to how 
different the institution between, say, “Luxembourg and South Korea”, or “Liberia and Cuba” is. 
Moreover, difference in income per capita between countries with low governance score and those 
with middle score is not statistically significant. However, regressions are conducted without 
considering this issue, and consequently, it is more likely for noticeable distinction in income per 
capita to be found only between countries with the lowest governance score and those with the highest 
score, implying endogeneity. 
 
Institution measurement is vague, not only in terms of index score, but also of explanatory variable 
selection. With regard to this, Keefer (2004) recognizes that “Knack and Keefer (1995), Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001), and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) all argue for the dominant 
effect of “institutions” on growth, but all use measures of the security of property rights as their 
measures of institutions.”1 While insisting that it should be understood as “broader, less well-
specified institutional concepts”, Keefer admits that several issues can come up because the 
governance literature concerns only with one question: “do property owners have protection from the 
arbitrary confiscation of their assets?”2 In other words, the main finding of the governance literature 
is that a country can be more prosperous as the property rights for investors seem to be better 
protected3.  
 
Setting the debate aside whether institution can be represented by security of property rights as a 
whole, Dani Rodrik and others (2002) agree that this conclusion only provides with weak policy 
implication. First and foremost, this result does not say about how the property rights should be 
implemented. Taking comparison between Russia and China as an example, Rodrik et al. discuss the 
contradiction that investors in China feel more secure about their assets than them in Russia, despite 
the fact that Chinese maintains socialist legal system while Russian formal system is much more 
                                                                        
1 27, Keefer 2004 
2 15, ibid. 
3 The reason why the property rights “for investors seem to be” better protected is that the property rights data from private rating agency 
like ICRG is based on perception of foreign investors. 
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conforming to European model. Consequently, it is hard to deduce operational guidance for 
institutional reform from this finding.   
 
Due to this ambiguity, only the list of good governance to follow suit gets longer and longer. Grindle 
(2004) makes this point by showing dramatically increasing number of good governance agenda on 
annual basis4, and criticizes that it is too demanding for developing countries to attend them. Besides, 
this can entail considerable opportunity cost wasting already deficient financial and human resources 
of developing countries, as Chang (2010) argued.  
 
2.2. Shifting the focus: from “outcomes” to “causal”  
 
The Growth Report published by World Bank indicates thirteen cases of economic success in postwar 
period which have achieved “high and sustained growth”, and they are as follows: Botswana; Brazil; 
China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Malta; Oman; 
Singapore; Taiwan, China; and Thailand (19, 2008)  
 
Table 3.Thirteen cases of successful economy 
Economy Period of high growth** Per capita income at the beginning and 2005*** 
Botswana 1960-2005 210 3,800 
Brazil 1950-1980 960 4,000 
China 1961-2005 105 1,400 
Hong Kong, China* 1960-1997 3,100 29,900 
Indonesia 1966-1997 200 900 
Japan* 1950-1983 3,500 39,600 
Korea, Rep. of* 1960-2001 1,100 13,200 
Malaysia 1967-1997 790 4,400 
Malta* 1963-1994 1,100 9,600 
Oman 1960-1999 950 9,000 
Singapore* 1967-2002 2,200 25,400 
Taiwan, China 1965-2002 1,500 16,400 
Thailand* 1960-1997 330 2,400 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
                                                                        
4 According to World Development Report, the number of items which should be done to achieve good governance increased from 45 in 
1997 to 116 in 2003. (3, Grindle 2004) 
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* Economies that have reached industrialized countries’ per capita income levels. 
**Period in which GDP growth was 7 percent per year or more 
***In constant US$ of 2000. 
 
The 13 successful stories have five points in common: “1) They fully exploited the world economy; 2) 
they maintained macroeconomic stability; 3) they mustered high rates of saving and investment; 4) 
they let markets allocate resources; 5) they had committed, credible, and capable governments (21, 
ibid).”  
 
According to the Keefer’s division (2004), the former 4 items are comparable to good policies so that 
fall into the first line of governance, while the last one comes under the second line, quality of 
government to respond citizen’s needs. However, as discussed above, it is hard to say with confidence 
that there is a fixed direction between the first category governance and growth, because it sometimes 
fits real world, but sometimes not. Therefore, maybe it is time for the current governance discourse to 
pay more attention to the second category, in order to be able to explain the economic development 
under “not so good” governance.  
 
Actually, it is not so difficult to suppose that more responsive governments would formulate and 
implement right policies in each nation’s own context, regardless whether the policies is recognized as 
“good governance” or not. The report elaborates on this as follows: 
 
“An economy’s endowment of labor, natural resources, and capital dictates its comparative 
advantage. But this mandate is very broad. The crowded, coastal economies of East Asia, for 
example, had a comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing. But what line of labor 
intensive manufacturing, precisely? Using what techniques? Those answers they had to discover for 
themselves through trial and error. This process of “self-discovery” may have been helped along by 
the government’s hand (25, World Bank 2008.)”  
 
This should not be read as assuming that a “benevolent government” must exist beforehand as a cure-
all and it is a necessary-sufficient condition for good governance. Rather, the gist of the argument is 
that appreciation of perceptiveness of government on public interest is a reasonable approach to 
understand its importance as a starting point of good governance, or, more prospects of right choice 
and action. 
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2.3. A key determinant of responsive government: Voice 
 
The next question must be how to improve government’s responsiveness or quality of government. 
Again, Keefer (2004) sorted it out properly as well, and table 4 below is the summary of it. 
 
Table 4.Two perspectives on remedying governance failure 
 
Type 1 Type 2 
Goal Making a condition under which government pursue beneficial policies for public  
Root of problem “flaws in the state apparatus (e.g. public 
administration)”  
Lack of “incentives of political actors” 
Solution 
Reforms in managerial system (e.g. 
mandatory participation of citizen in 
policy making in order to improve 
accountability; improving recruitment 
procedures by raising pay and stressing 
meritocracy and so on)  
Changing “the relationship between voters 
and politicians” (e.g. making voter 
information better regarding candidate’s 
performance or  pledges; providing with 
more chance for voters to mobilize and 
discuss about service delivery issues and so 
on)  
Features 
Considerable opportunities for outside 
assistance. 
More fundamental, 
Comparably less opportunities for outside 
assistance.  
Source: 41-42, Keefer 2004  
 
Referring to this Keefer’s division, it seems to be neutral and rational for the most of external actors to 
prefer type 1 solution, which deals with amending the procedural aspects of governance. However, 
more attentions should be turned to the second perspective, considering the repeated criticisms for 
ineffectiveness and limitations that the dominant first approach faced with, in changing willingness 
and behavior of rent-seeking regimes.   
 
Indeed, it is about advocating democracy, but fairly different from the conventional way. This paper is 
with the statement that “democratic rule and true voice can be separate in many times”, as viewed by 
many political scientists (Beetham,1999; Diamond,1999; Lindert, 2003; Hadenius and Teorell et al, 
2005; Coppedge and Gerring et al, 2011).  
 Due to the inherent complexities of democracy to be defined, maintaining contested election and 
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universal suffrage are generally regarded as adequate evidence of democratic rule (Przeworski et al., 
2000). However, this narrow concept of democracy has long been concerned for missing actual 
functioning as well. For example, the most renowned index for measuring democracy, Polity IV, 
marked the United States of America from mid 19th to 20th century as almost perfect democracy even 
though the black and women’s voice were effectively excluded during this period. Similarly, India 
keeps on scoring 9 out of 10 points in Polity index despite ongoing but invisible restrictions on 
marginalized groups such as backward castes and tribes which allow them only a limited role to play 
in policy making process. According to the Report of the National Commission for Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities constituted by government of India, OBC (Other Backward Classes) in central 
government positions comprises less than 10% while they form more than 40% of population. Along 
this line, Inglehart and Welzel note that “many of the new democracies show severe deficiencies in 
their actual practice of civil and political liberties” (149, 2005). 
 
 In sum, the alternative line tries to capture actual influence of citizens upon public decision making 
beyond the rights guaranteed only within official documents. Although measuring the abstract 
operation should be challenging, still this attempt seems worthwhile. Above all, the relationship 
between democracy and economic development can be more accurately analyzed, because such 
approach allows broader assumption that reflection of citizen’s demands by government matters for 
growth regardless of regime type. That is, the phenomena can be explained that some autocratic states 
achieved significant advance in economy while many other authoritarian and even some democratic 
countries fell behind. With regard to this, Lindert (2003) presents comparative examples of 
nineteenth-century Germany (Prussia) and India, which respectively represent a prosperous absolutist 
nation allowing autonomy by local beneficiaries on educational policy and a democratic and poor 
country restricting influence of lower classes over educational system. 
 Besides, emphasizing the importance of effective democracy is in the same vein of encouraging use 
of local knowledge in building institution, as Rodrik (2000) noted. The remark by Chairman Mao 
Zedong, made after the Great Chinese Famine resulted from excessive control over food distribution, 
illustrates this convincingly:  
 
“Without democracy, you have no understanding of what is happening down below; the situation 
will be unclear; you will be unable to collect sufficient opinions from all sides.” 5 
 
 
 
 
                                                                        
5 Mao Zedong, “On Democratic Centralism: Talk to an Enlarged Central Work Conference 20 January 1962”, in Mao Tse-Tung 
Unrehearsed, edited by Schram, p.146.; 340, Lindert 2003 recited. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Hypothesis  
 
This paper aims at finding out if there is a significant link between effective democracy and 
government performance. The methodology of measuring effective democracy refers to “Governance 
and Returns of Investment” (Isham et al. 1995), a World Bank empirical research on the link between 
civil liberties and Bank-financed project performance. The finding of this study is that “greater civil 
liberties are strongly associated with greater degree of civil unrest” (22, ibid) and in turn, the civil 
unrest indicators have positive and significant impact on projects’ economic rate of return.  
 
 
 
Table 5. Correlations between indices of civil liberties and civil unrest 
Civil liberties indicators 
Civil unrest 
(all variables adjusted for population effects) 
Riots Demonstrations Strikes 
Freedom house 
(Civil Liberties) 
(1978-87) 
.27 
(.00001) 
.17 
(.0001) 
.34 
(.0001) 
Media Pluralism 
(1983-87) 
.14 
(.0011) 
.24 
(.0001) 
.29 
(.0001) 
Freedom to organize 
(1983-87) 
.30 
(.0001) 
.29 
(.0001) 
.36 
(.0001) 
Source: 23, ibid 
* p-levels in parenthesis 
 
The interpretation of this finding is as following: 
 
“The results support a chain of causation that runs from greater civil liberties to higher 
levels of the citizen’s involvement- including civil manifestations- and to better projects. 
This is not to suggest that civil unrest is itself the mechanism: it is more likely that 
environments in which civil unrest is possible are also those in which other mechanisms for 
expression of popular (dis)content with government performances are available and 
effective” (24, ibid). 
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Within the context above, the civil unrest indicators will be understood as de facto democracy or 
means of local ownership in this paper, and indicated as Voice. This study is however different from 
the World Bank research in larger sample size, twenty nine vis-a-vis ninety three countries, and more 
direct attempt to link the Voice to government performance. There are surely other forms of citizen’s 
action such as media and press or peaceful demonstrations. However, they have been not chosen for 
two reasons: first, there are no such data covering long enough periods to reflect sufficient time lags; 
second, “voice with teeth”6 is supposed to be more influential on government’s behaviors.  
 
Also, the impact of international organization membership on government quality will be analyzed as 
a contrast with Voice, in the sense of that they respectively represent internal and external incentive 
for government to pursue public interest. The idea of regarding integration to international community 
as the external forces to impact on government’s quality is based on the argument by Chang (2010) 
that adoption of “better institutions”, or so-called Global Standard Institutions is widely recognized as 
an effective way to improve poor quality of governance in developing countries.  
 
Thus, the hypothesis of this study is as follows: 1) Voice had a significant impact on performance of 
government; 2) Integration to international community had a significant impact on performance of 
government.  
 
3.2. Statistical analysis model  
 
 
The basic model of statistic analysis of this paper is as follows:  
 
 
 
GROWTHit =β0+ β1GROWTHit-10+β3VOICEit-10+β4IOMit-10+λXit-10+εit 
 
 
 
The Dependent Variable, GROWTHit denotes GDP per capita growth rate (%) for country i at period t. 
The time span of GROWTHit variable is from 1984 to 2013, but 10 years average is applied to control 
contemporary event issue. That is, the years are divided and got averaged in this way: 1984-1993; 
1994-2003; 2004-2013. Also, GROWTHit variable is meant to gauge performance of government.  
 
Based on the observation by Chang (2010) that it normally takes at least about 10 years for 
institutions have impact on growth, 10 years time lags have been set for all the Independent Variables. 
The time span for the Independent Variables is, therefore, from 1974 to 2003. Average of 10 years is 
applied as well as the Dependent Variable as following: 1974-1983; 1984-1993; 1994-2003. 
                                                                        
6 10, Social accountability, 2013, Governance Global Practice 
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GROWTHit-10 is averaged growth rate of previous 10 years, and inserted in order to control mutual 
causality. Regarding the concerns for such endogeneity that the citizens of poorer and more repressive 
nations are more likely to express their discontent, the statistic analysis is designed to control it by 
adding initial value of government’s performance and Polity variable. They are represented by 
GROWTHit-10 and Xit-10 respectively, except Xit-10 is for other control variables as well. VOICEit-10, the 
variable of interest, stands for the civil unrest indicators, “Strikes” and “Riots”. IOMit-10 is for level of 
International Organization Membership, representing adoption of best practice. Lastly, εit is error term.  
 
  
3.3. Data and model specifications 
 
3.3.1. Dependent Variable 
 
GDP per capita growth (%) is used to gauge performance of government.  
 
3.3.2. Independent Variables 
 
The Voice variables such as ‘Strikes’ and ‘Riots’ are collected from Bank’s Cross National Time 
Series Data (CNTS) Archive, following the methodology of the World Bank paper (1995). The data 
set from the CNTS has a substantial advantage in its large coverage of time and nations, both are over 
200 years and 200 countries.7 This feature of the data set enables the research consider sufficient time 
lags between the Voice and government’s performance. With regard to the variable of Integration to 
international community, The KOF index of Globalization (2014) has been used and the details about 
construction of the index can be referred to appendix 2. 
 
The reference of Control variables, which represent influential economic factors on GDP growth, is 
“Determinants of economic growth” by Robert J. Barro (1998), and they are as following: Initial GDP; 
Net value of TOT (terms-of-trade); FDI/GDP(%); Inflation; and Investment. In addition, Institutions 
variables that are commonly acknowledged as growth factors are added: Literate (%); Rule of Law; 
Property Right; and Polity. Particularly, the variable of Polity can be understood as a proxy of 
procedural democracy.  
 
In respect to Dummy, Region Dummy of East Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa have been 
applied in OLS-dummy model. Instruments have also been applied in Three-stage Least Square 
(3SLS) model. This methodology refers to J. Barro (1998), in which average earlier value of 
                                                                        
7 http://www.cntsdata.com/ 
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instrument variables is employed as follows: GDP; Literacy rate; Net TOT; Investment; Polity; and 
Rule of Law, all in average of previous 5 years values. 
 
3.3.3. Models 
 
Four models have been utilized: 1) OLS; 2) OLS with region dummies; 3) Fixed Effect model; and 4) 
Three-Stage Least Square model. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Data description 
 
As presented below, the fluctuation is also wide enough for the most of variables, but the Voice 
variables have somewhat small standard deviation.  
 
Table 6. Data description 
VARIABLES Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable 
GDP per capita Growth (%) 294 5.46 4.69 -11.47 18.72 
Independent variables 
Initial GDP 
292 7222 11390 122 75609 
Net TOT 
251 109.12 29.15 27.36 277.17 
FDI/GDP (%) 
276 3.38 5.38 -2.26 64.90 
Inflation 
284 39.41 212.28 -2.26 2891.75 
Investment 
283 22.36 5.97 6.29 44.98 
Literate 
291 80.4 21.43 10.91 101.9 
Rule of Law 
288 3.69 1.44 0.56 6.00 
Property Right 
196 3.03 0.70 0.50 4.00 
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Polity 
291 3.67 6.58 -10.00 10.00 
Strikes 
294 0.17 0.34 0.00 2.10 
Riots 
294 0.39 1.04 0.00 12.60 
International 
Org. membership 
291 66.68 19.22 19.87 97.24 
Instruments 
GDP_iv 292 5467 8070 113 49364 
School_iv 294 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.14 
Rule of Law_iv 288 3.61 1.47 1.00 6.00 
TOT_iv 209 112.37 37.14 43.23 453.08 
Polity_iv 290 2.27 7.33 -10.00 10.00 
Investment_iv 273 23.13 7.02 6.29 66.06 
 
 
4.2. Empirical results 
 
Table 7. Regressions for per Capita Growth rate 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP (per capita) Growth (%) 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) OLS (2) OLS_dummy (3)Fixed Effect (4) 3SLS 
     
Initial GDP -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net TOT 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.073*** 0.055*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) 
FDI/GDP (%) 0.105** 0.106** 0.105 0.108*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.089) (0.040) 
Inflation -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.014 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) 
Investment 0.060 0.041 -0.116 0.079* 
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 (0.046) (0.051) (0.108) (0.045) 
Rule of Law -0.226 -0.330 -1.377 -0.402 
 (0.267) (0.305) (0.849) (0.287) 
Property Right -0.082 -0.102 0.916 -0.572 
 (0.544) (0.550) (1.259) (0.545) 
Polity 0.044 0.060 0.185 -0.022 
 (0.054) (0.057) (0.245) (0.054) 
Literate (%) 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.064 0.065*** 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.093) (0.016) 
Strikes -3.573*** -3.464*** -3.889** -3.206*** 
 (1.018) (1.065) (1.758) (0.964) 
Riots 1.530*** 1.442** 2.261* 0.995* 
 (0.564) (0.578) (1.146) (0.569) 
International Org. 0.031* 0.027 0.101 0.042** 
Membership (0.017) (0.019) (0.064) (0.018) 
 
GDP_iv 
    
1.369*** 
    (0.029) 
Literate_iv    3.334 
    (11.925) 
Rule of Law_iv    528.689** 
    (216.397) 
TOT_iv    14.956 
    (11.101) 
Investment_iv    -2.927 
    (34.330) 
Polity_iv    13.531 
    (37.963) 
Dummy_EastAsia  0.677   
  (1.134)   
Dummy_LatinAmerica  -0.559   
  (0.850)   
Dummy_SSA  -0.625   
  (0.880)   
Constant -7.995*** -6.405** -9.293 -6.552*** 
 (2.277) (2.901) (9.239) (2.435) 
     
Observations 182 182 182 143 
16 
 
R-squared 0.457 0.460 0.530 0.476 
Number of panel 93 93 93 93 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The result shows that there is a significant relationship between government performance and the 
following explanatory variables: Initial GDP; Net TOT; FDI/GDP(%); Inflation; Literate (%); and the 
Voice variables, Strikes and Riots. The consistent results of the well-known determinants for growth, 
such as Initial GDP; Net TOT; FDI/GDP(%); Inflation; Literate (%) contribute to confidence of this 
statistical analysis. Also, the mutual causality that richer countries allow more civil liberties seems to 
have been effectively controlled by the insertion of Initial GDP.  
 
Among the irrelevant variables whose p-value is not significant, the finding related to Polity variable 
is similar to the result of the World Bank reference (1995), despite the use of data from different 
sources: the Center on Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) for the World Bank and 
Polity IV for this study. The conclusion of the reference was that there is no clear pattern between 
political regime type and project returns, except for the extreme comparison between the most 
democratic and the most autocratic regimes.  
 
Against to this backdrop, the variables of interest, Strikes and Riots both have significant impact on 
performance of government, but to opposite directions. The negative effect of Strikes on growth can 
be interpreted that the economic loss on businesses resulted from strikes was much larger than benefit 
produced by government’s improved operation. On the contrary, the coefficient of Riots is positively 
significant, which supports this paper’s main hypothesis that citizen’s voice has a meaningful 
influence on performance of government.  
  
Meanwhile, the result related to International Organization Membership on government’s 
performance is mixed. It is statistically significant in OLS and 3SLS models at 10% and 5% 
significance level respectively. The fact that the IOM variable lost its significance in OLS with Region 
dummies and Fixed effect models allows an assumption that the improvement of governance 
seemingly resulted from best practice adoption stemmed actually from region-specific characteristics. 
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LIMITATIONS 
 
Although the main purpose of this study had been set to see the influence of citizen’s voice on 
performance of government, the unspecified channel between them is a major limitation of the 
discussion. With regard to this, the result that Literate (%) variable was statistically significant may 
have partially associated with the proposition that Education policy is the channel which suggested by 
Lindert in “Voice and Growth” (2003). Even then, further research is necessary to identify the proxy 
of government’s responsiveness to voice by public.  
 
In addition, several questions are expected to be raise which mostly deals with the basic assumption of 
this study: why should public uprisings represent the actual functioning of democracy? Is this making 
the argument that the reason for underdevelopment of nations is lack of protests?  
As commented in the first part of Methodology, the selection of proxy for effective democracy is 
based on the reasoning by the World Bank research (1995) that regards the condition under which 
more public complaints can be made as the more enabling setting for citizens to speak up. However, it 
seems that there are needs for the development of more decent index measuring actual functioning of 
democracy with more sufficient time and country coverage than the existing ones, in order for this 
argument to be generalized. Moreover, variable of government’s capacity in terms of bureaucratic 
quality is absent in the analysis due to limited data. If such variable is included, the analysis would be 
more balanced.  
 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION 
 
The ongoing controversy on whether governance matters for economic development of countries 
seems to be arisen from the discrepancy between the established theory and the real world. That is, the 
countries under “not so good” governance achieved great economic success not only in case of 
recently developed countries but also advanced countries at the age of their industrialization. This gap 
leads to a reasonable inference that not all the good governance matters, but only few of them are 
invariantly important for growth.  
 
Keefer (2004)’s division of governance dimension is useful to map this subject. The most of 
institutions that are commonly listed as good governance including security of property rights; law 
and order; stability of financial institutions; control of corruption belong to the “Outcomes” category 
of institutions which are granted by the authorities concerned. However, many scholars point out that 
it is not only impossible to follow the list completely, but also it should be in varied forms depending 
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on each country’s context.  
 
In this respect, it is requested to explore the other side, the “Causal” dimension of governance, which 
concerns the decision making process of government to meet public demands. Shifting the focus on 
the Causal governance is important because it can be an alternative to exhausted efforts by external 
contributors aimed at amending governance of rent-seeking regimes.  
 
The following discussion on how to improve such governance also can be divided into two categories: 
one is reform of administrative system; and the other is enforcing incentive for political actors. This 
study focuses the latter category, because it is the right direction for self-sustainability of recipient 
countries.  
 
Evidently the discussion has to progress to praising democracy as the force to compel proper choice 
of policies and action by government. However, people under the democracy only guaranteed in 
procedure and law cannot exert such influence on their ruler. For this reason, this paper placed an 
emphasis on democracy in practice rather than that in documents. Along this line, it conducted 
empirical analysis on the relationship between effective democracy and performance of government. 
The finding of the analysis is that effective democracy may have an impact on government’s 
performance in positive way.  
 
As widely accepted, democracy has a paradoxical nature that too much of it also causes many 
drawbacks as the deficiency of it does. However, promoting effective democracy in developing 
countries seems more reasonable approach than expecting their executive and the elites to be 
motivated leaders by themselves in passive way.  
 
To that end, first of all, more sensitivity is required to the inconsistency between procedural 
democracy and de facto democracy. Otherwise, repressed voice cannot be heard ever while 
misinterpretation can be widespread that democracy and performance of government are irrelevant for 
each other.  
 
In addition, dealing with bottleneck for repressed voice can be understood in the framework of 
governance improvement. Hence, the related work can fall together into the category, such as Human 
capital development, Local ownership, Decentralization and so on.  
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APPENDIX  
 
1. Country Coverage of the Data Set 
 
Country coverage 
 
Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Bolivia Botswana Brazil Bulgaria Cameroon 
Canada Chile China Colombia Congo Costa Rica Cuba Cyprus Denmark Dominican Republic 
Ecuador El Salvador Finland France Gabon Gambia Ghana Greece Guatemala Guinea Guyana Haiti 
Honduras Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kenya 
Korea, DPR Korea, South Kuwait Lebanon Liberia Libya Luxembourg Malawi Malaysia Mali 
Mexico Mongolia Morocco Myanmar Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria 
Norway Pakistan Panama Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Saudi Arabia 
Senegal Sierra Leone Singapore Somalia South Africa Spain Sudan Sweden Switzerland Syria 
Taiwan Tanzania  Thailand Togo Trinidad & Tobago Tunisia Turkey Uganda United Kingdom 
United States Uruguay Venezuela Zambia 
 
 
2. Definitions and sources of variables used in regression analysis 
 
Variables Definitions and constructions Sources 
GDP pc 
growth 
Percent annual change of Gross Domestic Product Per Capita 
(1984-2013): 
IMF national currency figure converted to $US on basis of 
prevailing market rate; 
UN Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations, 1950-. 
Banks, 
Cross National Time 
Series Data Archive 
Initial GDP 
per capita 
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita 
(1979-2013): 
IMF national currency figure converted to $US on basis of 
prevailing market rate; 
UN Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations, 1950-. 
Banks, 
Cross National Time 
Series Data Archive 
Net TOT Net barter terms of trade index (2000 = 100) World Bank 
FDI/GDP Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) (1984-2013) World Bank 
Inflation Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) World Bank 
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Investment Gross capital formation (% of GDP) (1979-2013) World Bank 
Literate (%) 
Percent Literate : 
“On the basis of nonliterates, 15 years of age and over. Literacy 
is defined in the UN Demographic Yearbook (from which most 
of the post-World War II data are extracted) as "ability both to 
read and to write".” 
Banks, 
Cross National Time 
Series Data Archive 
Rule of Law 
“Law and Order” form a single component, but its two elements 
are assessed separately, with each element being scored from 
zero to three points.  To assess the “Law” element, the strength 
and impartiality of the legal system are considered, while the 
“Order” element is an assessment of popular observance of the 
law (1984-2013) 
ICRG, the PRS group 
Property 
Right 
Component “Contract Viability/Expropriation”. This is an 
assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that are 
not covered by other political, economic and financial risk 
components. A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a 
score of 0 points to Very High Risk. (1984-2013) 
ICRG, the PRS group 
Polity 
Computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC 
score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). (1979-2013) 
Polity IV Project 2013 
Strikes 
“Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that 
involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national 
government policies or authority” (1984-2013): 
The New York Times and other periodicals. 
Banks, 
Cross National Time 
Series Data Archive 
Riots 
“Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens 
involving the use of physical force” (1984-2013): 
The New York Times and other periodicals. 
Banks, 
Cross National Time 
Series Data Archive 
International 
Organization 
membership 
Numbers added of “Absolute number of embassies in a country; 
Absolute number of international inter-governmental 
organizations; Personnel contributed to U.N. Security Council 
Missions per capita; Any document signed between two or more 
states and ratified by the highest legislative body of each 
country since 1945. Not ratified treaties, or subsequent actions, 
and annexes are not included. Treaties signed and ratified must 
be deposited in the Office of Secretary General of the United 
Nations to be included.” (1984-2013) 
KOF index of 
Globalization 2014 
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